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I. Introduction
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .1
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis

* J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2013. I would first and foremost like to thank
the 2013–2014 Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board, particularly, Julianne Gern, Lucas Wallace,
and Brian Fuller, for their valuable comments and time spent editing this Comment. I would also
like to thank Professor Sam Kalen for his inspiration and guidance while writing this Comment.
Last, I thank my family for their support and patience.
Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money: and How the Bankers Use It 92 (1914).
When Justice Brandeis wrote Other People’s Money: and How the Bankers Use It, he had not yet been
1
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In the passage quoted above, Justice Brandeis was expounding on the theory
underlying federal securities laws that require public corporations to disclose
certain information in an effort to make securities markets fairer and more
efficient.2 Because shareholders of large publicly traded corporations often have
little influence on the conduct of those corporations, securities disclosure is used
in various ways to influence a wide range of corporate behavior.3
Climate change is among the issues where shareholders hope to influence
corporate behavior through disclosure. Today, climate change is one of the most
important policy issues facing the world.4 More importantly, climate change
affects everyone, be it through droughts, floods, rising sea levels, or heat waves.5
Scientific consensus is that human activities have the largest influence on recent
climate change, mainly through the release of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere.6
In recent years, shareholders have started filing sustainability-related
resolutions asking companies to set greenhouse gas emission reduction goals,
appointed to the United States Supreme Court. He was appointed in 1916. Members of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Supreme Court of the united States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
Brandeis, supra note 1; see also Laura S. Unger, Speech by SEC Acting Chairman: This
Year’s Proxy Season: Sunlight Shines on Auditor Independence and Executive Compensation (June
25, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch502.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
2

Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations
Disclosure 81−82 (1980).
3

and

Information – Secrecy, Access, &

Margaret Rosso Grossman, Climate Change and the Law, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 223, 223
(2010); Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes From a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts
at Transformation Meet National Resistance in USA, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1351, 1353 (2008); Michael
B. Gerrard &. J. Cullen Howe, Global Climate Change: Legal Summary, SS028 ALI-ABA 583, 585
(2011). Regardless of one’s personal views about climate change, most agree that climate change
could have material financial impacts on many businesses, especially through increased costs of
regulatory compliance or changes in the competitive environment. Patricia Thrower Barmeyer et
al., The SEC and Climate: Disclosure Requirements 1 (Bradley M. Marten ed., 2010).
4

5
Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change: Basic Information, http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/basics/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). Climate change and global warming are not
the same. As the EPA explains in the following excerpt:

Global warming refers to the recent and ongoing rise in global average temperature
near Earth’s surface. It is caused mostly by increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. Global warming is causing climate patterns to change.
However, global warming itself represents only one aspect of climate change. Climate
change refers to any significant change in the measures of climate lasting for an
extended period of time. In other words, climate change includes major changes in
temperature, precipitation, or wind patterns, among other effects, that occur over
several decades or longer.
Id.
Id.; see also James Flynn, Climate of Confusion: Climate Change Litigation in the Wake of
American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 823, 823-24 (2013); John C. Dernbach
& Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 Energy L.J. 1, 4 (2008).
6
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publish sustainability reports, and pursue energy efficiency.7 Not until the 2013
proxy season, have shareholders filed resolutions asking companies to disclose
physical risks that climate change poses.8 This comes two years after the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) published its “Interpretive Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change” (Climate Change Guidance).9 Although
the SEC intended to guide companies with regard to their existing disclosure
obligations and not to introduce new rules, shareholders are relying upon the
Climate Change Guidance to request additional disclosures from companies.10
Investors hope the new disclosure scheme will lead to changes in companies’
behavior and internal processes regarding greenhouse gas emissions.11
One case that recently drew attention involved PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc. (PNC). The SEC staff denied PNC’s no-action request for excluding
a shareholder proposal from its proxy ballot.12 The proposal asked the company
to assess greenhouse gas emissions resulting from its lending portfolio as well as
PNC’s exposure to climate change risk.13 The SEC staff believed that climate
change is a significant social and public policy issue, and PNC could not exclude
a proposal addressing climate change.14
This Comment argues the SEC staff decision was an important step towards
recognizing climate change and its impact on corporations. But as important a
step as the SEC staff decision was, shareholder power remains limited. Part II will
outline the importance of climate change, discuss the shareholder proxy rules, and
Avery Fellow, Investors Demand Climate-Risk Disclosure in 2013 Proxies, Bloomberg
(Feb. 25, 2013, 1:34pm MT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-25/investors-demandclimate-risk-disclosure-in-2013-proxies.html (last visited on Nov. 12, 2013).
7

8
Id. A proxy is an authorization issued by a shareholder to another person to represent
him or act for him at a shareholders’ meeting. Black’s Law Dictionary 1346 (9th ed. 2009).
Because most shareholders choose to vote by proxy rather than attend a shareholders’ meeting in
person, the time when these annual shareholders’ meetings are held and when the accompanying
proxies are solicited is commonly referred to as proxy season. The proxy season usually runs from
February to May each year. See Proposed Rule on Internet Availability of Proxy Material, Exchange
Act Release No. 52,926, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,182, 86 SEC Docket 3163, 96
n.104 (proposed Dec. 8, 2005) (LEXIS) (referring to data by Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (now
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.) which handles the vast majority of proxy mailings to beneficial
owners for companies)).
9
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9106; Exchange Act Release No. 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290-01 (Feb. 8, 2010).
10
Id. at 6290 (stating that the release outlines the view of the Commission “with respect to
our existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change matters”).
11
Mia Mazza, Andrew Thorpe & Robert L. Falk, Challenges in Implementing the SEC’s New
Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change, 26(4) Corp. Couns. Q. 6 (2010).

PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6760041 (Feb.
13, 2013).
12

13

Id.

14

Id. at 1.
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outline the requirements for climate change disclosure set by the SEC Climate
Change Guidance.15 Part III of this Comment will analyze the PNC proposal and
the SEC reaction in light of the Climate Change Guidance and the effect of the
PNC decision on other companies.16

II. Background
A. Climate Change Risks
Climate change-related proposals similar to the one shareholders requested
from PNC are likely to increase in the future as environmental concerns among
shareholders grow.17 Climate change means a “significant and persistent change
in the mean state of the climate or its variability” caused by changes in the
environment.18 It is one of the most important global environmental problems
facing the world today.19 The year of 2012 was the warmest twelve-month period in
the United States since 1895.20 During 2012, the United States faced a devastating
drought throughout the West and Midwest, record wildfire activity, near-record
low Great Lakes levels, and Hurricane Sandy, which destroyed large parts of New
York City and New Jersey’s shore.21 These extreme weather events may have been
the result of climate change.22 They could also be precursors of extreme weather
events predicted to occur in the future as a result of climate change.23
Climate change affects everyone, including publicly traded companies.24
Some climate change risks affect companies directly, like those in the agriculture
industry where companies have to adapt to changing weather patterns or severe
15

See infra Part II., A–C.

16

See infra Part III.

See, e.g., Fellow, supra note 7 (citing a study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
Institute showing an increased support for such resolutions between 2005 and 2011).
17

18
Grossman, supra note 4, at 224 (citing US Global Change Research Program, Climate
Literacy: The Essential Principles of Climate Science 17 (2009)).
19

Id. at 223.

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 8 (Boston Common Asset Management, LLC
citing National Climatic Data Center Website, State of the Climate National Overview Annual
2012, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/
national/2012/13).
20

21

Id.

Coral Davenport, The Scary Truth About How Much Climate Change is Costing You, The
National Journal (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/
the-scary-truth-about-how-much-climate-change-is-costing-you-20130207.
22

Karl Ritter, United Nations’ Climate Negotiations Underway in Qatar, USA
Today, Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2012/11/27/climate-changehurricane-sandy/1730251/.
23

EPA, supra note 5. For example, Wall Street and the New York Stock Exchange shut down
for several days after Sandy. See Davenport, supra note 22.
24
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weather impacting plants and manufacturing facilities.25 Some climate change
risks only affect companies indirectly; for example, through increased regulation
of emission controls.26 Other companies, especially in the financial sector, are
affected only through shares or investments held in companies affected by climate
change.27 In the past several years, there has been a shift to increased interest in
disclosure on how climate change might affect current and future operations of
publicly traded companies.28 During the same period, a second, arguably related,
shift toward more sustainable corporate practices has also occurred.29
Investors, especially those with obligations to retain long-term value, such as
state pension funds, are at the forefront of the push for climate change disclosure.30
They argue that climate change will affect a company’s market value.31 To achieve
greater disclosure, these investors have pressured legislatures and regulators
to establish rules on climate change disclosure.32 Investors can also pressure
companies directly through the shareholder proposal process.33 In the past, such
Jeffrey A. Smith, Danielle Sugarman & Robert J. Stein, Sustainability Disclosure: Proxy
Exclusion & The Impact of SEC’s Decision in PNC Financial, 72 Wash. Legal Found. (WLF) 6 (May
2013), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/contemporarylegalnote/05-2013Smith
SugarmanStein_ContemporaryLegalNote.pdf.
25

26
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), Global Framework
Climate Risk Disclosure 4 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/
global-framework-for-climate-risk-disclosure-2006/view; Petition for Interpretive Guidance on
Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 4-547, 29 (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/
petn4-547.pdf.

for

27
Bettina Furrer, Volker Hoffmann & Marion Swoboda, Banking & Climate Change:
Opportunities and Risks 16-17 (2009), available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting-disclosure/swedish-presidency/files/
surveys_and_reports/banking_and_climate_change_-_sam_group_en.pdf; Barmeyer et al., supra
note 4, at 21.
28

Smith et al., supra note 25, at 3.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 6.

Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010
Interpretative Release, 6 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 487, 490 (2012) (citing the Petition for
Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 4-547, 5-10 (Sept. 18, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf ).
31

32
Id.; e.g., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, supra note 31;
Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Business Risk of Global Warming Regulation, No.
4-549 (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-459.pdf; see also Kassie
Siegeland, Kevin Bundy & Vera Pardee, Strong Law, Timid Implementation: How the EPA Can Apply
the Full Force of the Clean Air Act to Address the Climate Crisis, 30 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 185,
192 n.18 (2012) (discussing citizen petitions to the EPA).
33
Siegeland et al., supra note 32, at 192 n.18. As CERES reports, investors filed 110 shareholder resolutions with 94 U.S. companies on climate-related risks. Among those are, for example,
resolutions filed with CONSOL Energy and Alpha Natural Resources, two of the largest coal
companies, inquiring about the impact of climate change regulation on coal reserves. See also
CERES, 110 Shareholder Resolutions Related to Climate Change and Fossil Fuel Use Yield Strong
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shareholder proposals drew little attention and were often seen as a medium to
express shareholder views rather than to implement corporate change.34 Recently,
social-policy proposals have started receiving more shareholder support.35 A study
from the years 2006 through 2012 found that most shareholder proposals at
Fortune 200 companies concerned environmental issues.36

B. The Proxy and Shareholder Proposal Process
As a general principle, a company’s board of directors runs the day-to-day
business of a publicly traded corporation.37 Shareholders have no direct control
or influence over management of the company.38 However, shareholders elect the
directors who manage the corporation and vote to approve certain fundamental
corporate transactions.39 Shareholders in public corporations are widely dispersed
and generally do not attend shareholder meetings in person.40 For this reason,
shareholder votes must be solicited in advance through the proxy process.41 The
proxy process ensures shareholder participation in the affairs of the corporation.42
A proxy refers to an authorization a shareholder grants to a third party to cast
a vote at a shareholders’ meeting on the shareholder’s behalf.43 The corporation
collects proxies in advance of the meeting by sending proxy materials to each
shareholder. Elaborate securities laws and regulations govern these materials.44
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and accompanying SEC
Rule 14a-8 establish the relevant disclosure standards for proxy statements and
Results During 2013 Proxy Season (July 25, 2013), http://www.ceres.org/press/press-releases/110shareholder-resolutions-related-to-climate-change-and-fossil-fuel-use-yield-strong-results-during2013-proxy-season.
34

Smith et al., supra note 25, at 10.

CERES, supra note 33 (stating that the positive results in 2013 range from 40 proposals
withdrawn due to commitments from the companies, support votes as high as 38% for some
resolutions, and first-time carbon bubble resolutions receiving up to 22% support).
35

36
Smith et al., supra note 25, at 10; James R. Copland, Manhattan Institute’s Center for
Legal Policy, Proxy Monitor 2012: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Activism 13 (Fall 2012), available at http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_04.pdf.
37
Joseph A. Roy, Non-Traditional Activism: Using Shareholder Proposals to Urge LGBT NonDiscrimination Protection, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1513, 1516 (2009).
38

Id.

Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy,
23 Ga. L. Rev. 97, 97 (1988).
39

40

Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 Ind. L.J. 1259, 1264 (2009).

41

Id.

42

See Ryan, supra note 39, at 97.

Id. at 1264. In addition, “proxy” also refers to the instrument or paper that is evidence of
such grant of authority, as well as the agent or proxy holder who is authorized to vote. See also James
D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations § 13.26 (3rd ed. 2012).
43

44

Fairfax, supra note 40, at 1264.
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shareholder proposals.45 Such proxy materials include any items to be voted on
at the meeting and also provide a mechanism for shareholders to vote by proxy.46
Generally, most shareholders simply tick a box with their votes and return the
proxy cards to the company instead of attending the meeting in person.47
Any shareholder who continuously, for at least one year, held $2,000 or more
in market value, or one percent of the company’s securities entitled to be voted
on at the shareholder meeting, may submit one proposal to the company per
shareholder meeting.48 A shareholder proposal may recommend the company
or the board of directors take certain action, or it may propose imposing
requirements on the company or board.49 Shareholders have the right to submit
proposals independently to be voted on at the annual shareholder meeting. In
this case, the shareholder making the proposal bears the expense of sending it to
every shareholder of the company prior to the shareholders’ meeting.50 Instead,
shareholders prefer to submit their proposals to the company for inclusion in the
proxy materials that the company sends out to every shareholder.51
A company can exclude shareholder proposals for failure to adhere to the
procedural requirements or for certain other reasons.52 If a company chooses to
exclude a shareholder proposal, it must file its reasons for the exclusion with the
SEC staff and provide a copy to the shareholder.53 In addition, the company will
typically request a no-action letter from the SEC.54 This assures the company
45
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(a) (2012). Section 14(a) simply prohibits deceptive practices in the solicitation of proxies. The
SEC interpreted section 14(a) to insure fair corporate suffrage and shareholder participation as
to major questions of policy. It created Rule 14a-8 to permit shareholders to present proposals at
shareholders’ meetings. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Is the Quest for Corporate Responsibility a Wild
Goose Chase? The Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 44 Akron L. Rev. 479, 485 (2011).
Schedule 14A sets forth the information required in the proxy solicitations. See Thomas Lee Hazen,
3 Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 10.2(3), 67 (6th ed. 2009).

Hazen, supra note 45, at 71. See also N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Am. Brands, Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 1382, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that “proxy materials which fail to make reference to a
shareholders’ intention to present a proper proposal at the annual meeting renders the solicitation
inherently misleading”).
46

47
Eric Engle, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder Activism and
SEC Reporting Requirements, 57 Syracruse L. Rev. 63, 77 (2006).
48

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) and (c) (2012).

49

Id. § 240.14a-8(a).

Fairfax, supra note 40, 1265 (noting that the costs of sending out proxies to every share
holder can often be prohibitively high).
50

51

Roy, supra note 37, at 1517.

52

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(f ) and (i) (2012).

53

Id. § 240.14a-8(j).

Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-centered Corporation, 44 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 671, 673 (2009). According to the SEC, “[a] no-action letter is one in which an authorized
staff official indicates that the staff will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission
54
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informally that the SEC will not pursue legal action for excluding the proposal.55
The affected shareholder may submit a support letter to the SEC setting forth
his reasons why he disagrees with the company.56 After reviewing the documents,
the SEC staff will either concur with the company, the shareholder, or decline to
respond on the merits.57 In case of the former, it will issue a no-action letter, which
usually states that SEC staff “will not recommend any enforcement action to the
Commission.”58 If the SEC staff does not agree with the company that a proposal
may be excluded, it will deny the company’s request for a no-action letter.59

C. The “Ordinary Business Operations” Exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)
SEC Rule 14a-8 generally requires a company to include the proposal in its
proxy material for vote at the next shareholders’ meeting unless the shareholder has
not complied with the rule’s procedural requirements or the proposal falls within
one of the rule’s thirteen substantive bases for exclusion.60 One of these substantive

if the proposed transaction described in the incoming correspondence is consummated.” Procedures
Utilized by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal Advice, Securities Act
Release No. 6253, 21 SEC Docket 320, n.2 (Oct. 28, 1980).
Joo, supra note 54, at 673. The SEC retains discretion to pursue legal action. See infra note
263 and accompanying text.
55

Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters:
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 939 (1998) (citing SEC
Informal Procedures).
56

Id. No-action letters are issued by the shareholder proposal task force put together every fall
by the Division of Corporation Finance. Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Corporate Practice
Series, Shareholder Proposals: Detailed Analysis, SEC Staff No-Action Process, BNACPS No. 83-3
§ IV, 2013 WL 1095301. The task force has one level of examination and three levels of review. Id.
Individual staff examiners comprised of junior attorneys or more experienced staff attorneys from
other operation groups review each no-action request and prepare a memorandum analysis. Id. The
reviewers, who typically have previous no-action experience, review these reports and prepare a brief
recommendation report. Id. These reports are reviewed by one of the two or three senior reviewers
in the Office of Chief Counsel. Id. As a failsafe, all proposed no-action responses are reviewed by
a member of senior staff, such as the Chief Counsel, the Deputy Chief Counsel or the Associate
Director of the Division of Corporation Finance. Id. For significant no-action letters staff consults
with the Director of the Division. Id.
57

Nagy, supra note 56, at 939–40. Generally, SEC staff will not provide reasons, except
for rare explanations of their position or notes on which arguments they found persuasive. E.g.,
Microsoft Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 3804841 (Sept. 17, 2013).
58

BNA, supra note 57; If staff refuses to rule on the merits, it will typically indicate that
for “legal, policy, or practical considerations” it is unable to respond on the merits of a no-action
request. E.g., Hawaiian Trust Co. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176781 (June 7, 1991)).
59

SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A, 2002 WL 32987526 (July 12, 2002). The bases for
exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i) are: (1) Improper under state law; (2) Violation of law; (3) Violation of
proxy rules; (4) Personal grievance; (5) Relevance; (6) Absence of power/authority; (7) Management
functions; (8) Director elections; (9) Conflicts with company’s proposal; (10) Substantially
implemented; (11) Duplication; (12) Resubmissions; (13) Specific amount of dividends. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(i) (2012).
60
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reasons for excluding a shareholder proposal is Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which permits a
company to exclude a shareholder proposal that “deals with a matter relating to
the company’s ordinary business operations.”61 This rule protects the authority of
the company’s board of directors to manage company business.62 It is based on
two main concerns. First, “[c]ertain tasks,” such as hiring decisions or quantity
of production, “are so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company
on a day-by-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to
direct shareholder oversight.”63 Second, the rule seeks to prevent shareholders
from micro-managing the company’s highly complex matters.64 Examples of such
micro managing are proposals that seek intricate details, impose specific time
frames, or require specific methods for implementation.65
Day-to-day business decisions are left to management, except for subject
matters that “transcend[] the day-to-day business matters of the company
and raise[] policy issues so significant that [they] would be appropriate for a
shareholder vote.”66 As a result, the company can generally not exclude such
“significant policy” proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) “as long as a sufficient nexus
exists between the nature of the proposal and the company.”67 SEC decisions in
this regard are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature of the
proposal and the circumstances of the company.68 Thereby, the SEC considers the
presence of widespread public debate regarding an issue.69
“Ordinary business” is a term of art and refers to matters that are not
necessarily ordinary in the common meaning of the word.70 Rather, the term
refers to the corporate law concept that provides management with flexibility in
61

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2012).

Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, Invest
ment Company Act Release No. 23200, 67 SEC Docket 373, 4 (May 21, 1998).
62

63

Id.

64

Id. at 5.

65

Id.

66

SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF), 2009 WL 4363205, 3 (Oct. 27, 2009).

67

Id.

SEC Release on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 62, at 4. For example, the SEC con
sidered the following topics to be significant policy issues: the construction of a nuclear power
plant, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-12999, Investment Company Act Release No. 9539, 41
Fed. Reg. 52994, 52998 (Nov. 22, 1976), CEO succession planning, SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.
14E, supra note 66, at 3, plant closings or relocations, manufacture of tobacco products, executive
compensation, and golden parachutes, SEC Release on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 62, at 3,
or genetically engineered food, PepsiCo. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 132488 (Jan. 24,
2000). By contrast, terrorism or terrorism prevention is generally not a significant policy issue. See,
e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 170414 (Mar. 7, 2013); Kansas
City Southern, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 749309 (Mar. 14, 2008).
68

69

SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A, supra note 60.

70

SEC Release on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 62, at 2.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 10

298

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

directing certain core matters involving the company’s business and operations.71
To avoid being excluded under the ordinary business exception, the proposal must
focus on a significant policy issue and not just touch upon it or be crafted in its
context.72 This requires looking at the substance of the proposal.73 In a no-action
letter, the SEC concurred with Dominion Resources that a proposal requesting a
new program regarding renewable power generation was excludable even though
it touched upon the policy issue of environmental protection.74 The underlying
shareholder request implicated Dominion’s products and services offered; a matter
of ordinary business.75
Matters that relate to both a significant policy issue and ordinary business can
be excluded entirely.76 For example, a shareholder asked one company, Peregrine
Pharmaceuticals, to appoint a committee of independent directors to evaluate the
strategic direction of the company and the performance of management.77 The SEC
concurred with the company that the entire proposal could be excluded because
it contained extraordinary transactions and non-extraordinary transactions.78 The
SEC also concurred with Union Pacific, permitting exclusion of a proposal seeking
information of Union Pacific’s safety efforts on the basis that “the proposal appears
to include matters relating to Union Pacific’s ordinary business operations.”79

D. SEC Disclosure Requirements for Publicly-held Corporations
Since the 1960s, the SEC has required companies to discuss and analyze their
financial condition and results of operations in SEC filings.80 These disclosures
apply to companies filing registration statements relating to the offering of
securities pursuant to the Securities Act and companies subject to the Securities
Exchange Act.81 In general, a company must file annual and quarterly reports

71

Id.

72

Entergy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6736014 (Jan. 10, 2013).

SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, supra note 66, at 2; Dominion Resources Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 494126 (Feb. 9, 2011).
73

74

Dominion No-Action Letter, supra note 73.

75

Id.

See, e.g., Union Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 527446 (Feb. 25, 2008);
Peregrine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 2240164 (July 31, 2007);
General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 283635 (Feb. 3, 2005); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 152447 (Mar 15, 1999).
76

77

Peregrine No-Action Letter, supra note 76.

78

Id.

79

Union Pacific No-Action Letter, supra note 76.

80

Hansen, supra note 31, at 491.

Id. at 492 (providing for example that a company that publicly offers securities or has its
securities registered on a national exchange becomes subject to the disclosure rules).
81
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with the SEC and make them available to the public.82 These reports provide
key source information to investors about the company and its operations.83 The
purpose of these statements and reports is to protect investors and require full
disclosure of any relevant information deemed important for making an informed
investment or voting decision.84
The SEC has promulgated explicit disclosure requirements for these
reports in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.85 In addition to these explicit
disclosure requirements, a company must also disclose “such further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”86 Regulation
S-K governs the non-financial statement portions of registration statements,
annual, quarterly or other reports, shareholder reports and proxy information
statements.87 Regulation S-X contains the respective requirements for issuers’
financial statements.88
All of the SEC’s disclosure requirements are only triggered if the information
is material.89 Information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder (or investor) would consider it important in deciding
how to vote” or when making an investment decision.90 This standard does
not require that an investor would actually change his vote or investment
decision; information is material if it would be significant in the deliberations
of the reasonable shareholder or investor, or if it significantly alters the total
mix of information available.91 The rationale behind this standard is to separate
important information from less important information that would be irrelevant
to investors.92 The materiality standard is difficult to apply because there is no
generally accepted formula, especially with regard to trends and uncertainties.93
Companies should exercise caution to err on the side of disclosure because courts
favor disclosure in light of the purpose of the securities laws – investor protection.94
82

Id.

83

Id. at 493.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

17 C.F.R. § 230.408, § 240.12b-20 (2012).

87

Id. § 229.10(a)(1) and (2).

Hansen, supra note 31, at 492 (also pointing out that generally, a company must comply
with GAAP and FASB Accounting Standards).
88

89

Id. at 499.

90

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

91

Id. (referring to Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).

92

Hansen, supra note 31, at 500.

93

Id. at 501–08 (providing further references and examples of court decisions).

94

Id. at 508.
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Shareholders can file Rule 10b-5 fraud actions against a company for failing to
make required disclosures.95 In this regard, Rule 10b-5 provides an incentive to
comply with disclosure requirements.96
In the context of climate change, the most relevant disclosure rules are found
in Regulation S-K.97 “These are: Item 101—Description of Business; Item 103—
Legal Proceedings; Item 303—Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operation; and Item 503(c)—Risk Factors.”98 First, Item
101 of Regulation S-K requires a company to describe the general development of
its business during the past five years.99 Specifically, the company should describe
its form of organization, the principal products or services offered, markets,
distribution methods, major customers, suppliers, its research and development
practices, number of employees, working capital, and intellectual property.100
Second, Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires a company to describe any
material pending legal proceedings to which it is a party and any actions by
governmental authorities, excluding ordinary routine litigation incidental to its
business.101 Routine litigation does not encompass proceedings arising under any
environmental laws relating to the discharge of materials into the environment
or to the protection of the environment.102 The proceedings must be described
in detail if they are material to the business or financial condition of the
company, the potential damages exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the
company, or a governmental authority brought the action for monetary sanctions
exceeding $100,000.103
Third, Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K requires a company to discuss the most
significant factors that make an investment in the company’s securities speculative
or risky.104 The company must clearly specify any risks and their effects on the
company.105

95

tainable
96

Nickolas M. Boecher, SEC Interpretive Guidance for Climate-Related Disclosures, 10 Sus
Dev. L. & Pol’y 43 (2010).
Id. (pointing out that Rule 10b-5 civil fraud actions require a duty to disclose).

Hansen, supra note 31, at 492; see, e.g., TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448; United States v. Basic,
485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
97

98

Id.

99

17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a) (2011).

100

Id. § 229.101(c).

101

Id. § 229.103.

102

17 C.F.R. § 229.103 cmt. 5 (2011).

103

Id.

104

17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2011).

105

Id.
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Fourth, Item 303 of Regulation S-K relates to the Management’s Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A). In
this section, the company must provide a narrative discussion of the company’s
financials enabling investors to see the company through the eyes of management.106
Moreover, it must disclose: (1) “any known trends or any known demands,
commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably
likely to result in the registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in any
material way;”107 (2) any “material commitments for capital expenditures;”108
(3) “any known material trends, favorable or unfavorable, in the registrant’s
capital resources;”109 (4) “any expected material changes in the mix and relative
cost of such resources;”110 (5) “any unusual or infrequent events or transactions
or any significant economic changes that materially affected the amount of
reported income from continuing operations;”111 and (6) “any known trends or
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from
continuing operations.”112
The assessment of a trend under Item 303 requires a two-step analysis.
Management must first assess whether the uncertainty or trend will come to
fruition.113 If it will come to fruition, or if it must be assumed to do so, the
company must then determine whether it will have a material impact on the
company.114 If management finds that a trend is reasonably likely to occur, it
must move to step two of the analysis and determine whether there will be
material effects requiring disclosure.115 Management can avoid disclosure only if
it finds such occurrence is unlikely or that there will be no material effects for the
company.116 But if management cannot decide whether a trend is reasonably likely
to occur, management must make an objective evaluation of the consequences of
this trend, assuming that the trend will come to fruition and disclose any likely
material effects.117

106

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6294.

107

17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2011).

108

Id. § 229.303(a)(2)(i).

109

Id. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).

110

Id.

111

Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(i) (2011).

112

Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2011).

113

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6295.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.
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E. The Power of the SEC to Issue Interpretive Guidance
In releasing the Climate Change Guidance, the SEC sought to advance
climate change disclosure.118 The SEC has inherent powers to issue interpretations
of the federal securities laws and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder.119 This
power derives from Congress’ charge to the SEC to administer and enforce the
federal securities laws.120 Administrative agencies regularly interpret laws and their
own regulations in order to resolve cases and controversies arising within their
jurisdiction, to bring enforcement actions, to instruct their employees how to
carry out programs, or perform any other tasks entrusted to them.121
These agency interpretations may be classified as “rules” under the broad
definition of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).122 However, interpretive
rules and policy statements are distinguished from legislative or substantive
rules.123 These interpretive rules do not carry with them the force of law.124
Because these interpretive rules and policy statements are non-legislative rules,
they are exempt from notice or comment procedures.125 Yet, interpretive rules are
“extremely important in guiding practitioners through the regulatory maze.”126

118

Id. at 6290.

119

Nagy, supra note 56, at 931.

120

Id.; U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969,
1004 (1992).
121

Nagy, supra note 56, at 932. The APA defines “rules” broadly as “the whole or a part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2011).
122

Nagy, supra note 56, at 932 n.43. The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA Manual) defines interpretive rules as “rules or statements issued by an agency
to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”
T he A ttorney G eneral ’ s M anual on the A dministrative P rocedure A ct 30 n.3 (1947),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947iii.html. The APA Manual defines policy
statements as “statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise discretionary power.” Id. Legislative rules are “issued by an
agency pursuant to statutory authority and [] implement the statute.” Id. The Supreme Court has
given the APA Manual’s interpretations deference because of the role played by the Department of
Justice in drafting the APA. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
123

124
Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Treatise
ed. 2009).

on the

Law

of

Securities Regulation § 1.4, 61 (6th

125
Nagy, supra note 56, at 932. Courts have had difficulty applying the legal distinction. See,
e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that “the spectrum
between a clearly interpretive rule and a clearly substantive one is a hazy continuum”). See Kristin E.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of ) Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1727, 1732−35 (2007) (discussing
the APA comment and notice procedures).
126

Hazen, supra note 124, at 61.
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The SEC often issues releases for different purposes.127 For example, the SEC
may issue a release if it wishes to clarify the meaning or effect of existing statutes
or rules, especially if those statutes or rules contain vague standards or are rarely
judicially interpreted.128 Sometimes, the SEC announces the formal adoption of
new rules or amendments to rules and explains how the SEC intends to apply
these rules.129 In addition, the SEC notifies the public about proposed rules or
amendments to rules and solicits public comment.130 In particular, SEC Divisions
will publish releases to explain their views on various issues regarding statutes or
SEC rules.131
Interpretations of federal securities laws and SEC rules promulgate
thereunder reflect the views of the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance.132
“They are not rules, regulations, or statements of the Commission. Further, the
Commission has neither approved nor disapproved these interpretations.”133
Thus, these views are highly informal and are not binding.134 Accordingly, the
interpretations are intended as general guidance, and companies should not rely
upon them as definitive.135

F. The SEC Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure
Until the release of the Climate Change Guidance, companies faced the
challenge of determining what they should be saying in their mandatory SEC
filings about the effects of climate change on their businesses.136 Some of the
difficulties included determining how and when climate change will have a
127

Nagy, supra note 56, at 932−33 n.44.

Id.; see, e.g., Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970–1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 78,192, 80,578 (Aug. 16, 1971).
128

Nagy, supra note 56, at 932–33 n.44; see, e.g., Revision of Holding Period Requirements
in Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 63 SEC Docket 2077 (Feb. 20, 1997).
129

Nagy, supra note 56, at 932−33 n.44; see, e.g., Revision of Holding Period Requirements
in Rule 144; Section 16(a) Reporting of Equity Swaps and Other Derivative Securities, Securities
Act Release No. 7187, Exchange Act Release No. 35896, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 85,638, 86,881 (June 27, 1995). See generally Hazen, supra note 124, at 60, 62−63 (discussing
SEC releases).
130

131
Nagy, supra note 56, at 932−33 n.44; see, e.g., Applicability of the Investment Advisors Act
to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1092,
52 Fed. Reg. 38,400 (Oct. 8, 1987).

Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC, (last modified May 30, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfguidance.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
132

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Hansen, supra note 31, at 490.
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material impact on the company and what the potential effects of climate
change legislation or international initiatives are without being speculative or
misleading.137 Thus, before the release of the Climate Change Guidance, several
studies of SEC filings suggested that climate change disclosure was often lacking
or not sufficiently informative.138
The SEC approved the Climate Change Guidance by a vote of three to two
in 2010, three years after large institutional investors filed a petition for such
guidance with the SEC.139 It stated that “[t]his release outlines [the SEC’s] views
with respect to [its] existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate
change matters. This [G]uidance is intended to assist companies in satisfying their
disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws and regulations.”140 One of
the dissenting commissioners argued that the physical risks of climate change were
not relevant for disclosure because they are not reasonably foreseeable and often
occur only over a span of years or decades.141 Moreover, the SEC lacked expertise
for regulating climate change.142 The Climate Change Guidance’s disclosure
requirements apply to all companies or issuers subject to federal securities laws.143
The Climate Change Guidance did not create new laws or regulations
but merely clarified existing laws and regulations.144 It provided sample areas
“where climate change may trigger disclosure,” such as the impact of legislation,
regulation, or international accords on business operations, indirect consequences
of regulation or business trends, and physical impacts.145 Companies should also
consider reputational, financial or other indirect risks.146 The Climate Change
Guidance outlined where companies should consider climate change in their
disclosure documents.147
First, under Item 101 of Regulation S-K—which requires a company to
describe its business—a company must disclose any “[f ]ederal, [s]tate, and local
provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials
into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment”
137

Id.

138

Id. at 508 (citing to several studies).

139

Id. at 487.

140

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6290.

Kathleen L. Casey, Statement at Open Meeting – Interpretive Release Regarding Climate
Change Matters (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710klc-climate.
htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
141

142

Id.

143

Hansen, supra note 31, at 492.

144

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6290, 6297.

145

Id. at 6295–97.

146

Id. at 6296.

147

Id. at 6290.
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that affect its “capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position,” including
expenditures for environmental control facilities.148 Smaller reporting companies
need only describe the costs and effects of compliance with such environmental
laws.149 In the context of climate change, this may potentially include the financial
and competitive effects of greenhouse gas emissions regulations, and cap and
trade systems.150 Other examples include the development of new products,
technologies, or production methods based on climate change.151
Second, Item 103 of Regulation S-K—relating to material, pending, legal
proceedings of the company—may require disclosure of proceedings under any
environmental laws relating to the discharge of materials into the environment
or to the protection of the environment.152 Examples of such proceedings
may be plaintiffs seeking redress against large emitters of greenhouse gases or
manufacturers of products emitting these gases, or litigation seeking to stop the
construction of coal fired power plants.153

148
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2011). Such disclosure applies for example to companies
operating in countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. These companies would have to report
the capital costs associated with technology upgrades to reduce emissions, costs of greenhouse
gas emissions credits purchased under a cap-and-trade program, and the costs of monitoring and
reporting emissions. See Barmeyer et al., supra note 4, at 4.

17 C.F.R. § 229.101(h)(4)(xi) (2011). Regulation S-B offers disclosure relief (from the
heavy and costly burden) to small companies (with less than $25 million in revenues and less than
$25 million in market capitalization) through a more tailored small business reporting scheme (Form
10-KSB and Form 10-QSB). 17 C.F.R. § 228.10 (2009). The SEC developed Regulation S-B as
part of its small business initiatives. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949,
Exchange Act Release No. 30968, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2287, Financial Reporting
Release No. 38, 51 S.E.C. Docket 2154 (July 30, 1992). See generally Paul Rose, Balancing Public
Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 Willamette L. Rev. 707,
740 (2005).
149

Hansen, supra note 31, at 493. Although there is no broad Congressional greenhouse gas
legislation, the EPA issued a number of regulations and rules addressing emissions limitations or
reporting regimes. E.g., EPA Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56, 260
(Oct. 30, 2009). Moreover, states have taken action against climate change. For example, the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 and regulatory actions by the California Air
Resources Board have restricted greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (including ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states), the Western Climate Initiative
(including seven Western states and four Canadian provinces) and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord (including six states and one Canadian province) have been developed to restrict
greenhouse gas emissions. SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6290 n.7.
150

Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14 Fordham J.
Corp. & Fin. L. 281, 287 (2009).
151

17 C.F.R. § 229.103 cmt. 5 (2011). Legal proceedings encompass administrative, civil, and
criminal proceedings. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,507B, at 17,203−17,205 (Sept. 27, 1979).
152

Mark Latham, Environmental Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for
Improved Disclosure of Climate-Change related Risks, 39 Envtl. L. 647, 665 (2009).
153
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Third, under Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K which relates to risk factors, a
company must disclose any risks as a result of climate change, such as water quality
or scarcity because of its effects on supply costs or production capacity.154 Other
examples include the effects of greenhouse gas emission regulations and limits,
natural disasters, geographic and topographic changes, increasing energy costs,
and dwindling resources.155 Regarding climate change legislation, the Guidance
points out that disclosure of risks is different for companies in different industries,
such as energy or transportation companies because such risks should be assessed
depending on each company’s particular circumstances.156 Risk factors could also
include decreased demand for goods that produce greenhouse gas emissions or
increased demand for energy generated from alternative sources.157
Fourth, under Item 303 of Regulation S-K, a company should discuss pending
legislation, regulations, or climate change as trends or uncertainties having an
effect on the business.158 Without quantifying a specific future time period for
the consideration of such trends or uncertainties, the SEC stresses that the trend
or uncertainty must be presently known to management and be reasonably likely
to have a material effect on the financial condition or results of operations of
the company.159 However, the Climate Change Guidance cautions that, while
materiality may limit the amount of information disclosed, the materiality
standard should not limit the information management considers when making
its determinations about a trend or its effects on the company.160 This includes
consideration of both financial and non-financial information.161 Companies also
are reminded to disclose information necessary to an understanding of its financial
condition, as well as changes in financial condition and results of operations.162
In the context of climate change disclosure, companies consider proposed
greenhouse gas legislation, costs and effects of compliance with international
accords, investments in mitigation technology, and competitive pressures resulting
154

Hansen, supra note 31, at 496.

155

Id. (providing additional references).

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6296. As the SEC noted, transportation
companies only rely on products that emit greenhouse gases, creating different risks from climate
change legislation or regulation compared to energy companies.
156

157

Id.

158

Hansen, supra note 31, at 495.

159

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6294−95.

Id. In general, the materiality standard ensures that companies only disclose information
necessary to promote understanding of the business and not unnecessary detail, duplicative, or
uninformative information lessening the effectiveness of disclosure. Commission Guidance
Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,
Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48960, Financial Reporting Release No.
72, 81 S.E.C. Docket 2905, 9−10 (Dec. 19, 2003).
160

161

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6295.

162

Id.
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from production and distribution of climate friendly or unfriendly products.163
Insurance companies have been among the first to note effects of climate change
on their business.164 Many more companies may be affected by rising insurance
costs, increasing freight costs due to low river levels or weather disruptions, rising
food prices, or property damage.165
Management must first assess whether an uncertainty such as pending
legislation or regulation is likely to be enacted.166 If management finds that it is
reasonably likely to be enacted, it then must proceed assuming that the legislation
will be enacted.167 Second, management must determine whether the legislation,
if enacted, is reasonably likely to have a material effect on the company.168 If
management finds that a material effect is likely, it must disclose the potential
effect of pending legislation or regulation and the difficulties involved in assessing
the timing and effect of such legislation.169

G. The SEC Decision in the PNC Financial Services Group
No-Action Request
A recent No-Action request by PNC Financial Services Group is the source
of renewed focus on climate change disclosure and related shareholder proposals.
Unlike most companies receiving climate change related shareholder proposals,
PNC is a financial services holding company with a diversified portfolio engaging
in retail, corporate and institutional banking, asset management, and residential
mortgages.170 PNC’s day-to-day activities comprise lending, financing and
investing.171 In December 2012, PNC informed the SEC of its intent to omit
a shareholder proposal that Boston Common Asset Management LLC (BCAM)
made from its proxy form for PNC’s 2013 annual shareholder meeting.172
The proposal requested “that the Board of Directors report to shareholders
by September 2013, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,
163

Hansen, supra note 31, at 496.

Davenport, supra note 22 (noting that insurance companies were among the first to note
effects of climate change on their business due to extreme weather because they have to pay out
associated claims).
164

165

Id.

166

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6296.

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id.

PNC No-Action letter, supra note 12, at 17. As of Sept. 30, 2012, PNC had consolidated
total assets of $300.8 billion, total deposits of $206.3 billion, and total equity of $41.8 billion. Its
total loan commitment was $182 billion as of that date, and comprised over sixty percent of the
balance sheet.
170

171

Id.

172

Id.
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PNC’s assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from its lending
portfolio and its exposure to climate change risk in its lending, investing, and
financing activities.”173
PNC argued it could omit the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because it
related to matters of ordinary business for two reasons: First, the evaluation of
risks, including climate change risks, regarding its lending portfolio is a day-today business decision; and second, there is no nexus between climate change
and PNC.174
Because PNC’s day-to-day business is lending, financing, and investing,
the company continually evaluates risk using a wide range of factors.175 PNC
argued climate change risk is “just one of many risks” it considers “as part of its
daily operations” and should be viewed as a fundamental day-to-day business
activity.176 The proposal, PNC reasoned, should be excludable as ordinary business
activity even though it involves an environmental issue.177 According to PNC, the
problem of balancing the risks arising from climate change against other risks and
considerations related to the resolution of ordinary business problems.178 Hence,
it was “impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an
annual shareholders meeting.”179
PNC supported its argument by citing SEC decisions involving similar
climate change proposals made to other banks, such as Wachovia Corporation,
American International Group, Inc., and Chubb Corporation, which the SEC
held excludable under rule 14a-8(i)(7).180 The Wachovia proposal requested a
report on the effect of climate change risks on Wachovia’s business strategy.181
American International Group and Chubb were permitted to exclude proposals
requesting them to report comprehensive assessments of the companies’ strategies
to address the impacts of climate change on their businesses.182
Additionally, PNC argued that there was no sufficient nexus between the
company and the nature of the proposal.183 As a financial services company,
173

Id. at 15.

174

Id. at 16–18.

175

Id. at 17.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id. (quoting Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 62, at 4).

180

Id. at 18.

181

Wachovia Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 267915 (Jan. 28, 2005).

American Int’l Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 299079 (Feb. 11, 2004);
Chubb Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 193246 (Jan. 25, 2004).
182

183

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 18.
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PNC provides financial products and services to a wide range of customers and
is not engaged in coal mining, mountain top removal mining, or other resourceintensive activity.184 PNC suggested that the way its customers use the funds
provided to them—for payroll, rent, office supplies—should not be of PNC’s
concern.185 Hence, there was no primary link between controversial actions and
its lending practices.186
BCAM, the shareholder proponent, wrote a support letter to the SEC in
opposition to PNC.187 It reasoned that the proposal focused on a significant policy
issue and had a sufficient nexus to PNC.188 First, BCAM highlighted why climate
change is a significant policy issue by citing the SEC Climate Change Guidance as
well as other recent no-action letters acknowledging the new SEC staff position.189
In these more recent no-action precedents from 2011, SEC staff reversed their
prior position that climate change was not a significant policy issue.190
As BCAM also pointed out, PNC acknowledged in other disclosures that
a “lack of clear carbon emissions strategy, or a low perceived action plan, could
cause PNC to lose valuable customers and investors, or limit [its] ability to attract
new customers and investors.”191 BCAM argued that because PNC has substantial
commitments to mountaintop removal companies that contribute significantly to
climate change in its lending portfolio it could be affected indirectly by climate
change.192 PNC’s policy on climate change could further affect BCAM because
PNC may be exposed to reputational risk associated with its involvement in
mountaintop removal as well as financial risk resulting from the poor performance
of these companies due to increased compliance costs or market downgrades.193
184
Id. Mountaintop removal is a form of coal mining where the tops of mountains are literally
removed to access coal underneath the surface. Mountaintop removal mining is especially criticized for contributing to climate change twofold; first, by destroying the forest which stores carbon,
and second, by burning the coal mined from these operations. See Ending Mountaintop Removal,
Center for Biological Diversity, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/
mining/mountaintop_removal/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
185

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 18.

Id. (citing two decisions by the SEC allowing exclusion of proposals requesting policies
barring funding for mountain top removal coal mining; Bank of America Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2010 WL 4922465 (Feb. 24, 2010); JP Morgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010
WL 147293 (Mar. 12, 2010)).
186

187

Id. at 2.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 3 – 4, 8–12.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 5196317 (Feb. 07,
2011); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 50598 (Mar. 01, 2011);
see infra note 217 and accompanying text.
190

191

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 5.

192

Id.

193

Id. at 7.
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In addition, BCAM showed that there was a clear nexus between PNC and
climate change.194 PNC’s reputation could be substantially damaged by linking
PNC to mountaintop removal mining through its investments.195 Furthermore,
PNC could sustain substantial financial loss if the mining companies would receive
downgrades or suffer financial loss themselves due to, for example, limitations on
their business operations from increased regulation.196
BCAM also noted that the proposal did not micromanage PNC by prohibiting
it from investing in mining companies or prescribing detailed action plans.197 The
proposal merely requested a report to the shareholders.198
The SEC staff declined to issue a no-action Letter and denied PNC’s request
to omit the shareholder proposal.199 The brief statement merely reads:
We are unable to concur in your view that PNC may exclude the
proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). In arriving at this position, we
note that the proposal focuses on the significant policy issue of
climate change. Accordingly, we do not believe that PNC may
omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule
14a-8(i)(7).200
Ultimately, PNC included the proposal when it filed its definite proxy
statement with the SEC on March 14, 2013.201 PNC management also included
a statement in opposition, noting that such a report would require “monumental
analytical effort,” extensive additional training for employees, hiring of new
employees, implementation of new systems and processes, and outside consulting
services.202 At PNC’s shareholder meeting on April 23, 2013, the proposal was
rejected by majority vote of 77.2% to 22.8%.203

194

Id.

195

Id. at 5– 6.

196

Id. at 6.

197

Id. at 7–8.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 1.

200

Id.

PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the SEC
Act of 1934, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/000130817913000071/
lpnc_def14a.htm#_N197C4. (Mar. 14, 2013).
201

202

Id.

PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the SEC Act of 1934 (Form 8-K), (Apr. 29, 2013).
203
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III. Analysis
This section first analyzes how the PNC decision recognized climate change
as a “significant policy issue” and its importance for other market participants.204
Then, it outlines the limitations of the PNC no-action letter and provides thought
on the shareholder proposal process in enhancing disclosure in general.205 Last, it
examines the role of the SEC Guidance in enhancing climate change disclosure.206
Shareholder control and influence over corporations and management is a
prominent issue in corporate law.207 Some shareholders want to influence corporate
behavior.208 This influence is important because shareholders are concerned about
the management of a company and its effects on their investment.209 One way
to exert such influence is through shareholder proposals because the proposals
allow a platform for voicing concerns or suggestions about the company to fellow
shareholders.210 However, such power is also limited because of the generous
exceptions created by Rule 14a-8 and the SEC.211 In this regard, the broad
“ordinary business operations” exclusion rule is of particular concern.212 The SEC
created the “significant policy” exception to allow shareholders to raise important
issues that are of “considerable importance” to shareholders.213 What is considered
a “significant policy” issue changes over time.214 This is also true for of climate
change which only in recent years has become a global issue.

A. The SEC Recognizes Climate Change as a “Significant Policy” Issue
The SEC’s decision in the PNC No-Action request marked a departure from
previous SEC rulings on climate change disclosure. As late as the mid-2000s,
SEC staff allowed exclusion of similar climate change proposals, reasoning those
proposals presented a question involving the ordinary day-to-day business of

204

See infra Part III.A.

205

See infra Part III.C–D.

206

See infra Part III.E.

207

Roy, supra note 37, at 1516.

Id. (pointing out that some shareholders are “rationally apathetic” because they only
own a fraction of shares and have few incentives to fight with management; however, big funds
or other corporate shareholders may own a larger share and care more about the performance of
their investment).
208

209

Id.

210

Id. at 1517.

211

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2011).

212

Roy, supra note 37, at 1520.

Proposals by Security Holders Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,598, Investment Company Act Release No. 9345, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,984
(July 20, 1976).
213

214

Roy, supra note 37, at 1529.
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the company.215 This practice changed with the issuance of the SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14E in 2009 and the Guidance in early 2010.216 In 2011, the SEC
began to acknowledge the significance of climate change as a policy issue regarding
shareholder proposals.217
As the SEC noted in 1998, it frequently adjusts its view with respect to “social
policy” proposals involving ordinary business in line with changing societal
views.218 In the case of climate change, this is most likely due to increased public
awareness of climate change. Furthermore, the increased public debate about
climate change resulted in increased regulation and legislation. As BCAM noted
in support of its proposal, “there is a groundswell of policymaking under way on
[the] issue [of climate change] at the international, federal, and state level, and
the public and media have come to recognize climate change is happening.”219
The Guidance demonstrates the SEC’s recognition of the significance of climate
change, stating climate change “has become a topic of intense public discussion”
spurring national and international regulatory activity.220 The Guidance even
noted that financial risks may arise from physical risks to entities other than the
registrants themselves.221

B. The Importance of the PNC Decision for Others
First, the addressee usually accepts the SEC staff ’s no-action letter because of
time, money and negative publicity involved with litigating the issue.222 This was
also the case for PNC, which distributed the shareholder proposal with its proxy
material instead of risking a legal fight.223 The reason behind this lack of interest
215
PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 2, 3 (citing Wachovia No-Action Letter, supra
note 181; American Int’l No-Action Letter, supra note 182; Chubb No-Action Letter, supra note
182); see also OGE Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 541778 (Feb. 27, 2008).
216
SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6290; SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E,
supra note 66.
217
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 50598 (Mar. 01,
2011) (the proposal requested that Goldman Sachs prepare a global warming report. The SEC
denied exclusion of the proposal based on Rule 14a-8(i)(7), but allowed it under Rule 14a-8(i)
(11)); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 5196317 (Feb. 07,
2011) (this proposal asked Goldman Sachs to prepare a report disclosing the business risk related
to developments in the political, legislative, regulatory, and scientific landscape regarding climate
change. Exclusion was also denied based on Rule 14a-8(i)(7)).
218

SEC Release on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 62, at 3.

219

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 3.

SEC Climate Change Guidance, supra note 9, at 6290. Such regulatory activities include
the California Global Warming Solutions Act, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western
Climate Initiative, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, and EPA’s greenhouse
gas reporting program. Id.
220

221

Id. at 6291.

222

Nagy, supra note 56, at 956–57.

223

See supra note 201and accompanying text.
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in further litigation may be the limited force that shareholder resolutions have
on the company. Even if the shareholder proposal were to receive a majority of
the shareholders’ votes, a company could choose to ignore it because shareholder
resolutions are typically non-binding.224 Moreover, management has little to lose
by including a proposal because generally they receive few votes.225
PNC’s no-action letter is important for other companies. It can serve as
guidance for other financial institutions heavily invested in companies that are
most affected by climate change. It also highlights climate change as an important
public policy issue. No-action letters have an enormous practical impact on the
regulatory process because they are usually the only available guidance for other
companies and investors.226 They have a profound effect on all market participants
because other companies and investors model their behavior after the positions
taken by SEC staff in no-action letters.227 Thus, many companies, for example,
would discontinue a business practice if SEC staff disapproved it in a no-action
letter or investors crafted their shareholder proposals in light of other proposals
that received positive no-action treatment.228 In short, no-action letters shed light
on SEC’s views on a current issue.229
The SEC uses no-action letters as a strategic policy-making tool.230 Through
these decisions, the SEC influences climate change legislation and regulation as
well as corporate behavior.231 This broad strategy is possible due to the easy public
availability of no-action letters, the SEC’s practical retreat from its theoretical
“addressee-only” position, and other regulatory advantages.232 No-action letters
do not require public comment or notice; rather, they can be issued immediately
with regard to a specific question.233 A previously voiced position may also be
modified or retracted easily in a new no-action letter.234
The public has also accepted SEC staff positions in no-action letters as
authoritative largely because they often present the only available guidance on a
rule or statute.235 Moreover, the SEC has demonstrated in its actions a willingness
224

Joo, supra note 55, at 673; Ryan, supra note 39, at 112.

225

Hazen, supra note 45, at 299.

226

Nagy, supra note 56, at 946.

227

Id. at 947.

228

Id.

229

Hazen, supra note 124, at 66.

230

Nagy, supra note 56, at 947.

Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the Securities Industry?,
11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 765, 767 (2006).
231

232

Nagy, supra note 56, at 948–53.

233

Id. at 951–52.

234

Id. at 953.

235

Id. at 954.
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to adhere to the positions in no-action letters.236 If the Commission disagrees
with a policy, it will often announce that fact and caution the public to no longer
rely on the previous policy.237 The SEC also treats no-action letters as reliable
authority in its releases or court briefs.238

C. Limitations of the PNC No-Action Letter
Despite the advantages of no-action letters, a no-action letter also has several
limitations and does not act as precedent per se. First, the no-action letters only
represent SEC staff ’s informal views.239 Thus, they do not, and cannot, adjudicate
the merits of a company’s position with respect to a proposal.240 Only a federal
court can decide whether a company may omit a proposal with binding effect.241
Accordingly, the SEC’s no-action letter represents an informal recommendation
whether to take SEC enforcement action or not based on the current views of the
SEC staff.242 Any proponent, shareholder, or the company itself may pursue their
rights in court.243 This means that a shareholder whose proposal was omitted may
bring an action against the company to enjoin the board to include the proposal
in the proxy materials.244
236

Id.

Id.; see Hazen, supra note 124, at 65. A reason for this may be that such a change may be
unreasonable. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Emps. Pension Plan v. Am. Int’l Grp.,
462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the SEC’s consistent no-action position over a period of
time could not be changed by a no-action response; instead the SEC would have to engage in formal
rulemaking with notice).
237

238

Nagy, supra note 56, at 955.

239

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 2.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.; see also BNA, supra note 57.

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 2. If SEC staff deems a proposal excludable,
the shareholder may pursue his legal arguments in federal court in an action against the company
alleging a Rule 14a-8 violation. Nagy, supra note 56, at 940. Alternatively, the shareholder may
request SEC staff to reconsider its position in which case SEC staff will either reverse or affirm its
previous no-action position. See BNA, supra note 57. SEC staff infrequently grants a request for
reconsideration. Id. The standard is high. Id. In general, petitioners must present additional or new
facts that could not have been brought before, show a change in law or no-action precedent, or show
that the no-action response was erroneous or contrary to other precedent. Id. The shareholder may
also request SEC review of the no-action letter. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2011). Because of the
high burden, the remedy is rather extraordinary and such requests are rarely granted. See BNA, supra
note 57. For example, in the 2011 proxy season, all ten requests, out of nearly 300 no-action letters,
were denied. Id. The Commission has the option to (1) grant and affirm a staff no-action letter;
(2) grant and reverse such letter; or (3) decline the request for review. Id. Reversals are extremely
rare. Id. Between 2008 and 2012, it appears that the Commission never reversed a staff position. Id.
243

244
New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1995). Whether the
aggrieved shareholder or company may pursue their rights against the SEC in court is a disputed
issue. Nagy, supra note 56, at 945. Although each federal securities statute contains a provision
allowing for judicial appellate review of Commission orders, there are questions as to its availability.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/10

26

Martin: Can Shareholders Bring the Sun to Climate Change Disclosure - Ref

2014

Comment

315

While the SEC staff ’s position does not bind courts, courts do “rel[y] on the
consistency of the [SEC] staff ’s position and reasoning on a given issue, or the lack
of consistency, in determining whether a proposal that was deemed excludable
by the [SEC] staff can in fact be omitted.”245 Generally, SEC staff interpretive
statements in no-action letters do not receive the automatic judicial deference of
Chevron or Seminole Rock.246 Such deference usually applies to formal and official
SEC orders or rules.247 Reasonable interpretations of SEC rules articulated in other
SEC releases also receive deference based on Seminole Rock if the interpretation
seeks to clarify a SEC rule.248
However, courts often evade the difficult question of deference to
interpretations in no-action letters.249 Nevertheless, case law suggests a trend
towards deference to SEC decisions.250 Many federal district courts have in fact
deferred to SEC authority without providing any reasons or on occasion by citing
to Chevron.251 Some courts even fail to distinguish between SEC staff and the
Commission itself, or even analogize a no-action letter to a formal SEC order.252
Id. “No-action letters may be challenged as rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), as an arbitrary or capricious conclusion of law under the APA, or as a “final order” under
Section 25 of the Exchange Act.” BNA, supra note 57; see 15 U.S.C. § 78y (2012). The Second
Circuit rejected a rulemaking challenge and held that a no-action letter is interpretive, rather than
legislative, and therefore not subject to the APA notice and comment rules. New York City Emps.’
Ret. Sys, 45 F.3d at 12. Similarly, the Second Circuit, referring to Section 704 of the APA, implied
that plaintiffs could not sue the SEC under Section 706 of the APA because they had an adequate
alternative remedy against the company. Id. at 23. Generally, the issuance of a no-action letter by
SEC staff is not such a final SEC order and is not reviewed by courts. See generally Bd. of Trade of
the City of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1989). Similarly, if the Commission refuses
to review a no-action letter, there is no final agency action. Nagy, supra note 56, at 945. If the
Commission did review a no-action letter affirming or reversing the no-action position, it may be
reviewable as a final SEC order. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 675
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Not all courts follow this precedent. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994); Missud v. SEC, C-12-00161 DMR, 2012
WL 2917769 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff ’d (Oct. 15, 2012).
245
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp.
877, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
246
Nagy, supra note 56, at 967. Chevron requires federal courts to defer to any reasonable
interpretation by an agency charged with administration of a statute, provided Congress has not
clearly specified a contrary answer. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). Seminole Rock grants similar deference to informal administrative interpretation
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). See generally Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 49 (2000).
247

Nagy, supra note 56, at 977–78.

248

Id.

249

Id. at 979 (providing examples).

250

Telman, supra note 45, at 490.

251

Nagy, supra note 56, at 981.

252

Id. at 982.
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However, deference to the SEC is not universal. Some district courts choose not
to defer to SEC staff no-action letters.253 In one case, the choice not to grant
deference may be explained by the fact that the no-action letter conflicted with
other official SEC interpretations.254
Judicial deference to SEC interpretations of its own rules makes sense
considering the general lack of expertise of judges in securities law matters. The
SEC and its staff deal with securities laws on a daily basis and are experts in the
field. However, SEC failure to accept no-action letters as binding interpretations
of its own rules is problematic. The SEC’s position that its own no-action letters
are merely informal recommendations seems to undermine the important role
no-action letters play in practice and in litigated cases. Moreover, SEC staff should
be careful to follow official SEC interpretations and avoid contradictions. This
may not be easy in practice because of the sheer number of no-action requests
and the resulting split of responsibilities of SEC staff in replying to all in a timely
manner.255 But companies or shareholders who notice such contradictions are
encouraged to petition for reconsideration and point out the differences.256
Second, third parties cannot generally rely on no-action letters because
any response is subject to reconsideration.257 The letters are based on the facts
and arguments in the particular no-action request.258 They do not act like legal
precedents in court but—in the absence of other authority on point—merely
guide practitioners.259 In addition, the SEC’s views also change with a change in
administration and politics.260 Frequently, no-action letters contradict each other
or conflict with official positions of the SEC.261 In that case, a court may choose
not to rely on the no-action letter and defer to the official SEC position.262
However, the SEC should accept the important role no-action letters play
for other companies and third parties. The SEC should view and treat no-action
letters as precedent similar to court decisions. In case it wants to change its
position, it can explicitly overrule a prior no-action position. This may make
253

Id. at 985.

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp.
877, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
254

255

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

256

See supra note 243 and accompanying text.

257

Nagy, supra note 56, at 942.

258

BNA, supra note 57.

259

Nagy, supra note 56, at 953–54.

See New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Bd. of
Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1989)).
260

261
Joo, supra note 55, at 675. Sometimes, the SEC will amend its official position following
contradictory no-action letters. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
262

See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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it easier for market participants to follow current SEC practice. It may also be
easier for a reviewing court to follow. Treating no-action letters as precedent
would also not prevent the SEC from officially voicing a position in a formal
statement. These formal statements would carry more force than informal
no-action letters because they apply broadly to everybody and are not fact-specific,
unlike no-action requests.
Third, the SEC retains discretion to institute enforcement action against a
company despite issuing a no-action letter.263 The Commission expressly argues
that SEC staff responses are not binding.264 While this may be true in theory, it
rarely happens in practice that the SEC institutes enforcement action where SEC
staff has not so indicated.265 Thus, this statement seems more like a boilerplate
hedge against too much reliance on no-action letters. But as mentioned before,
market participants do rely on no-action letters.
Perhaps realizing the impact of the PNC decision, the SEC cautioned that
the decision with regard to PNC “was meant only to address PNC” and “did not
create a new duty for the entire financial services industry.”266 In particular, the
“decision was driven by ‘the particular facts surrounding PNC’s request, including
the nature of the bank’s own lending criteria and public statements.’”267 According
to the SEC, the financial sector as a whole need not consider the issue of climate
change, especially those companies without “meaningful” investments that
impact climate change.268 In this way, the SEC sought to limit the applicability of
the PNC decision for other financial institutions to only those that are in similar
positions as PNC.

263
Nagy, supra note 56, at 942; see also Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v.
SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that no-action letters are interpretative because they
do not bind the SEC, the parties, or the courts).
264
Nagy, supra note 56, at 942 (citing SEC, Monthly Publication of List of Significant Letters
Issued by the Division of Corporation Finance, Release No. 5691, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (“The
Commission is not bound by these staff responses . . . The staff ’s responses to letters are not rulings
of the Commission or its staff on questions of law or fact . . . Further, such letters are not intended
to affect the rights of private persons.”)).
265
Id. at 943; but see Morgan Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 28,990, Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-7473 (Mar. 20, 1991) (where the SEC charged violations of limits on sale of control
person stock in connection with stock sale to satisfy margin requirements despite a prior favorable
no-action letter).

BNA, Daily Environment Report: SEC says Scope of Climate Risk Decision Involving PNC
Financial is Limited, Feb. 21, 2013 (35 DEN A-15), available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X6SD5FK4000000 (citing SEC spokesman John Nester).
266

267

Id. (quoting John Nester of the SEC).

268

Id.
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D. Thoughts about the Shareholder Proposal Process and its Role for
Enhanced Climate Change Disclosure
In its support letter to the SEC, BCAM stressed that despite the Climate
Change Guidance and other disclosure initiatives, shareholder resolutions provide
a powerful mechanism for encouraging companies to enhance their disclosure.269
Yet, most of the shareholders proposing special resolutions on social policy issues
pursue personal interests.270 These special concerns may not be beneficial for all
the shareholders or the company itself.271 It seems that, sometimes, shareholders
may be more concerned with a “political crusade” masked as shareholder activism
than their value of their investment in the company.272 Shareholder proposals only
have a proper place in the proxy process if they relate to the corporate purposes,
or even corporate reputation or good will.273
In many cases, special interest resolutions receive only meager support from
shareholders.274 This is mainly due to the proxy system itself, where shareholders
defer to management to make the decisions.275 But in recent years, voting support
among shareholders for social and environmental resolutions has increased.276
Moreover, the number of these shareholder proposals has also increased.277
Numerous proposals seek information about greenhouse gas emissions, energy
usage, or even emissions reduction targets.278 Like the PNC proposal, others
seek to limit lending and investment by financial institutions for companies that
present environmental risk.279 This suggests that more shareholders are interested
in these issues and the proposals are not just special interest resolutions.
Some companies include shareholder proposals without fighting them,
incurring almost no cost and saving time, and even garnering some good will for
the company.280 Another option is to implement the substance of the proposal.281
269

PNC No-Action Letter, supra note 12, at 4.

270

Fairfax, supra note 40, at 1270–71.

Id. These proposals may also be excluded under the “personal grievance” exception. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(4) (2011).
271

272

Telman, supra note 45, at 481.

273

Id. at 483.

274

See Fellow, supra note 7.

275

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

276

Fellow, supra note 7.

277

Id.

Matthew P. Allen, Eric M. Jamison & Mark J. Bennett, SEC Opens the Door for Climate
Change-related Shareholder Proposals and Disclosure Requirements, with Potential New Liabilities for
Public Companies, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 359 (2010).
278

279

Id.

280

Hazen, supra note 45, at 299.

Id. at 306. Although a rare choice. See, e.g., Northern Trust Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2006 WL 401186 (Feb. 13, 2006) (where the proponent noted: “Thank you for agreeing to initiate
281
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Other companies actively respond to shareholder proposals instead of seeking
no-action relief. This is another way shareholder proposals have an impact on
corporate behavior. Generally, the board of directors includes a statement of the
company’s views regarding shareholder proposals in the proxy statement, and
requests the shareholders to vote against the proposal.282 Some companies use this
opportunity strategically to disclose their progress and success with a particular
course of action.283 Other companies engage in dialogues with their shareholders
about a proposal, which may lead the shareholder to withdraw the proposal if the
company provides a satisfying answer.284 This allows a company to avoid a costly
battle with the shareholder through the no-action process.285
Although the case-by-case approach of no-action letters may not be the most
efficient lawmaking process, it does work quite well in practice.286 The line between
legitimate shareholder concerns and management issues is fine and can best be
addressed on a case-by-case basis.287 If proposals merely seek to advance political
interests over legitimate concern for corporate profits, it should be excludable.
Using a case-by-case approach, the SEC is in the best position to weed out such
“political crusades.”288
Some claim that the shareholder proposal process has an “absurdist theater”
about it because the proposal can only ask the company to form a committee
or prepare a report.289 They claim this because, if the proposal were to ask for
a specific action, it would be seen as micromanaging the company and thus be
excludable.290 Yet, this approach allows for a proper balance between shareholders
voicing their concerns and management running the business. Corporations
should not foot the bill for dealing with social issues, best left to legislators,
which have no significance or relation to their business.291 Yet, climate change
may have a significant impact on businesses and is thus relevant in the shareholder
proposal process.
the process of implementing ‘majority vote’ in your bylaws and governance guidelines. Because of
that agreement we hereby withdraw our proposal”).
282
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E. The Role of the SEC Climate Change Guidance in Enhancing Disclosure
Notwithstanding the successes of shareholder proposals, the Climate Change
Guidance provides for mandatory centralized disclosure rules.292 By disclosing
climate change information to shareholders, companies may also be able to avoid
shareholder proposals. Many companies engage in voluntary disclosure, such as
the Carbon Disclosure Project or the Global Reporting Initiative.293 But these
reporting mechanisms are decentralized and may be insufficient to fully inform
investors.294 Voluntarily disclosed information may need to be disclosed under
SEC disclosure requirements.295 There is also increased pressure on companies to
include voluntarily disclosed information in SEC filings.296 Companies should
also ensure that voluntary and mandatory disclosure is not inconsistent.297 This
means that the information provided to shareholders through the mandated SEC
disclosure should not contradict the information provided to the public in general
by way of voluntary disclosure schemes. If this were the case, shareholders could
argue that the disclosure is misleading or even false. This does not mean that they
have to be identical.298 Voluntary disclosure is generally more extensive, as it may
include information that would not meet the SEC materiality standards.299
Despite these voluntary initiatives, disclosure has been slow in the past,
mainly for practical reasons. Climate change is so pervasive that an evaluation
of the risks associated with it may be costly and time-consuming.300 Companies
may struggle or be unable to evaluate climate risk impacts on their business on
an individual basis for this reason. Others may fail to fully appreciate the risks.301
Moreover, climate change risks and forecasts are inherently long-term by nature
whereas some companies or investors have a more short-term approach.302
Interestingly, the Climate Change Guidance does not guide companies
regarding how to assess climate change. Then SEC-Chairwoman Mary Shapiro
asserted that the SEC is neutral on the facts and science of whether or not climate
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change is occurring.303 However, the Climate Change Guidance indicates that the
effects of climate change on a business may be material to investors and require
disclosure.304 The question whether the SEC embraces climate change or not
remains one of the main controversies over the Guidance.305 The importance of
the Climate Change Guidance may be that companies are put on notice that the
SEC would devote greater attention to climate change disclosure in the future.306
And some have observed an increase in climate change disclosure already.307
The SEC’s position leaves companies with the task of determining which
information on climate change is reliable, or whether the science surrounding
climate change is too uncertain, or whether effects of climate change are likely
to come to fruition.308 It has been suggested that, after the release of the Climate
Change Guidance, few companies will be bold enough to remain silent, because
the SEC will be looking for such disclosure.309 Similar judgment calls must be
made about the likelihood of passage or adoption of legislative or regulatory
measures that are very uncertain at this point.310 The Climate Change Guidance
does not leave a “we have no idea” option for companies, even if it is true for a
particular company.311 Yet, the SEC discourages speculative disclosure.312
Additionally, the Climate Change Guidance has been criticized for not
carrying the force or permanence of law that a formal rule would carry.313 This
makes it more difficult for shareholders in a Rule 10b-5 fraud action to assert
Robert E. McDonnell et. al, Roadmap for Disclosure or Recipe for Boilerplate? The SEC
Issues Interpretive Guidance for Climate Change Disclosures, available at http://www.martindale.com/
environmental-law/article_Bingham-McCutchen-LLP_917438.htm (Feb. 19, 2010) (quoting Ms.
Shapiro from the January 27, 2010 open meeting). The SEC in an accompanying press release
stated the following:
303

[T]he Commission is not making any kind of statement regarding the facts as they
relate to the topic of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming.’ And, we are not opining on
whether the world’s climate is changing; at what pace it might be changing; or due to
what causes. Nothing the Commission does today should be construed as weighing
in on those topics.
Mary Shapiro, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement before the Open Commission on Disclosure
Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-climate.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
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a lack of disclosure because the Climate Change Guidance does not impose a
new duty.314 Even so, litigants may find arguments for disclosure in the Climate
Change Guidance.315 Ultimately, only Congress can end the uncertainty about
pending climate change legislation. Should Congress enact broad climate change
legislation, companies would have to comply with it. Companies would then
have to disclose under existing securities laws how they comply with it and how it
affects their business and operations.
On the other hand, by not imposing an express duty to disclose climate change
impacts, the Climate Change Guidance also acts as a guard against abusive fraud
actions against companies.316 A guidance is more flexible and can be amended
more easily when science changes.317 But the Climate Change Guidance may
still force companies to strengthen their internal disclosure processes to ensure
that management can make these decisions with sufficient information and force
companies to make climate change disclosure.318 Internally, management may
be asking questions of supply-chain partners or monitoring developing areas of
law not previously monitored before.319 The Climate Change Guidance does not
require companies to disclose their internal assessment processes in arriving at
the decision whether or not to disclose climate change related risks.320 Though
this may leave some investors wondering, it also serves to separate important
information from less important, irrelevant information.321 Investors will be able
to draw their own conclusions about the presence or absence of climate change
disclosure.322 Most importantly, the Climate Change Guidance eliminates the
possibility that companies will ignore climate change and its risks.323
With the lack of congressional action on climate change, the SEC tried to
balance the interests of shareholders in more disclosure and the interests of the
companies in avoiding costly disclosure. It seems like the SEC wanted to address
investors’ concerns about climate change without taking a side in the political
debate.324 Although the Climate Change Guidance claims to merely remind
issuers of their existing disclosure obligations, it effectively adds climate change to
the list of items to be disclosed. As studies indicated, since the Climate Change
314

Boecher, supra note 95.

315

Id.

316

Id.

317

McFarland, supra note 151, at 309.

318

Mazza et al., supra note 11.

319

Id.

320

Hansen, supra note 31, at 534.

321

Id.

322

Id.

323

Mazza et al., supra note 11.

324

Hansen, supra note 31, at 520.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/10

34

Martin: Can Shareholders Bring the Sun to Climate Change Disclosure - Ref

2014

Comment

323

Guidance issuers have devoted more resources to climate change disclosure and
increased disclosure.325 This shows that companies take the issue of climate change
more serious after the release of the Climate Change Guidance and increase
their disclosure. Although, at least one commentator noted that the increase was
modest and that most companies only address some climate change risks.326

IV. Conclusion
SEC staff ’s denial of a no-action letter to PNC’s request to exclude a
shareholder proposal concerning PNC’s exposure to climate change risk was an
important step for shareholders in the quest to obtain climate change disclosure
from companies.327 But shareholder power in the governance of a company is
generally too limited to effect any direct changes in a company’s behavior.328
Moreover, many shareholders simply may not care about a company’s response
to climate change because they hold few shares—usually through nominees—
and mainly for investment purposes.329 Whether and how companies respond
to the challenge of climate change depends less on shareholder governance than
on outside forces that appeal both to the moral conscience and self-interest
of a corporation’s executives.330 One of the most important factors for more
climate change disclosure will be federal or state legislation and regulation.331
Yet, shareholder proposals have an important place in corporate governance
in addressing shareholders’ concerns and providing a platform for voicing
these concerns.332 Acknowledging the importance of shareholder proposals
and the underlying no-action process, the SEC should give more weight to its
no-action letters.333
A better tool to achieve more disclosure is regulation and legislation. In this
regard, the recent SEC Climate Change Guidance on the disclosure of climate
change related risks clarifies companies’ regular disclosure with regard to climate
change risks without creating any new rules.334 The Climate Change Guidance
cannot address the underlying climate change causes, as it is limited to enhancing
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disclosure under securities laws and regulations.335 However, after the Climate
Change Guidance’s release, companies can no longer ignore the effects of climate
change and are actively asked to assess and monitor climate change and how
it affects their business.336 Thus, the Climate Change Guidance was a step in
the right direction. Even so, climate change disclosure is mainly predicated upon
judgments of materiality and an understanding of the facts and circumstances
surrounding a particular company.337 In the end, while publicity may enhance
disclosure on climate change, disclosure itself does not do anything to lessen
climate change’s underlying causes.
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